

The Carbon Capture Mirage

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that promises to capture carbon dioxide (CO₂) either from smokestacks or the air and then permanently keep it from entering the atmosphere. Unlike a transition to renewable energy, storage, and electrification — which would entail a re-ordering of the energy system and an end to the fossil fuel industry — CCS promises to preserve a “clean fossil fuel” industry forever. By promising compatibility with the current fossil fuel energy system, CCS enables continued fossil fuel investment and a delay of climate action even as the CCS install dates recede into the future.

At best, CCS burns money on speculative tech to pretend that there is an escape hatch for fossil fuel investments. At worst, funding CCS supports a business model that generates CO₂ just to later capture it, subsidizing fossil fuel production for the sake of pollution. In practice, CCS currently functions as a back door for subsidizing existing fossil fuel infrastructure. Despite the enduring political appeal of CCS, for the most part the technology remains permanently stuck in the project announcement phase. Carbon capture advocates continue to suggest that widespread adoption is just around the corner if only they could get higher subsidies, a few more grants, and reprieve from burdensome regulation.

This report finds:

- Continued failure of CCS to live up to promises
- Ongoing re-branding of current fossil fuel industry activities to create the illusion of progress on CCS
- An increasingly lax CCS subsidy and regulatory regime needed to keep the illusion afloat
- Dangerous pay-to-pollute incentives that this subsidy system creates
- A glimpse into the future of CCS and how it supports dead-end industries with no hope of full decarbonization.

Carbon Capture Has Been Hyped and Subsidized for Decades

From clean coal to carbon capture: CCS emerges as the fossil fuel industry's preferred alternative to renewable energy

CCS grew out of federal “clean coal” efforts, which received \$2.6 billion from the program's inception in 1984 through 1990, producing few commercially viable technologies.¹ In 2003, President George W. Bush revived clean coal with a \$1 billion coal power plant focused on capturing carbon emissions under the FutureGen program.² During the Bush administration, Congress established the Clean Coal Power Initiative, providing \$2 billion to fund private sector coal demonstration projects such as CCS.³

The 2005 Energy Policy Act created \$1.65 billion in tax credits for clean coal facilities.⁴ In 2006, the Bush administration announced that \$1 billion of the credits would go to nine clean coal facilities.⁵ However, by 2008, “new market realities” forced the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) to restructure the program into up to three smaller demonstration projects.⁶ These projects were

touted as a way to boost oil production by supplementing the supply of naturally occurring CO₂ that oil producers injected into older oil reservoirs to increase production, a process known as enhanced oil recovery (EOR).⁷

During the 2008 presidential election, the coal industry made a deal with then-candidate Barack Obama, running ads on his behalf touting the magic of clean coal CCS as a climate solution (while others in the Democratic party, such as Al Gore, were calling for 100 percent renewable electricity by 2018).⁸ At the time, industry groups were very optimistic about the technology. In 2009, the International Energy Agency (IEA) released a roadmap for CCS predicting 121 million metric tons of CO₂ capture per year by 2020 in North America.⁹ A year earlier, a vice president from the clean coal industry group the American Coalition for Clean Coal Electricity said that CCS technology existed and that, “With the current research being done, we think we can get the technology up and running within 10 to 15 years.”¹⁰

The Obama administration delivers for the CCS industry, but the projects fail to pan out

CCS proponents were set to get far more federal investment in the technology than “current research.” In 2009, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) offered \$3.4 billion for the research and development of CCS projects (with nearly \$1 billion going unspent).¹¹ With billions flowing to CCS, in early 2010 President Obama claimed that, “Rapid commercial development and deployment of clean coal technologies, particularly carbon capture and storage, will help position the United States as a leader in the global clean energy race.”¹² Later that year, the DOE supplemented the claim with a roadmap highlighting DOE-supported CCS projects with a combined 16.8 million tons per year of capacity that would be operational by 2016.¹³

Much like earlier attempts to make CCS viable, during this period CCS underperformed spectacularly.¹⁴ Out of 11 large-scale demonstration projects selected by the DOE, 9 were funded by the ARRA and only 3 remained operational as of mid-2025.¹⁵ Of the five commercial power plant projects, only one (Petra Nova) ever reached operation, and it faced serious challenges, forcing the plant to close after fewer than four years.¹⁶ An MIT database of carbon capture projects through September 2016 recorded 15 cancelled carbon capture projects, but that list is not exhaustive; more than 30 coal plants announced in the mid 2000s considered carbon capture.¹⁷ The DOE roadmap admitted that this generation of carbon capture projects would use much of the CO₂ for oil extraction.¹⁸

The flagship CCS boondoggle of the Obama era

Southern Company’s notorious power plant project in Kemper, Mississippi appeared in the DOE’s 2010 roadmap for its Clean Coal Power Initiative program.¹⁹ The project aimed to build a “clean coal” plant and use the captured emissions for EOR.²⁰ In 2012, the Global CCS Institute claimed that, “The next key event for the advance of pre-combustion capture technology will be the integrated operation of the first [integrated gasification combined cycle, or IGCC] plant with capture at the Kemper County IGCC plant in Mississippi in 2014.”²¹

Even before it was completed, the Kemper project served as crucial evidence for those advocating that an “all of the above” energy policy could address climate change.²² Advocates claimed that it would provide a viable way to continue using coal.²³ Referring to the Kemper plant as proof of CCS viability, in 2014 a Clean Air Task Force (CATF) representative said, “It would be pretty hard to argue that this technology does not exist when it is standing there on 55 acres and many many storeys towering above you.”²⁴

The Kemper plant aimed to capture 2 million metric tons of CO₂ per year — 65 percent of its total emissions.²⁵ The project was awarded at least \$680 million in federal grants and tax credits, (nearly 25 percent more than the infamous loan to Solyndra)²⁶, including millions that Southern Company managed to redirect from another failed clean coal project in Orlando, Florida.²⁷ Set to open in 2013, Kemper pushed back its opening day for years.²⁸ By 2015, the project’s overall budget had ballooned from \$1.8 billion to \$6.2 billion.²⁹ Critical parts of the plant were torn down and rebuilt due to construction challenges, such as a misunderstanding of chemical reactions that led to the replacement of 1,500 feet of pipe.³⁰ In 2015, Southern Company claimed that the project was “98 percent or so complete”³¹ By 2017, fed up with delays and overruns, regulators forced the Kemper plant to abandon its clean coal plans completely.³²

CCS supporters continue to make outlandish predictions.

In 2022, the Princeton University-affiliated REPEAT Project predicted that passage of the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) would result in more than 50 million metric tons per year of additional CCS in the U.S. for “transport and geologic storage” by 2024.³³ REPEAT would later claim that the law would encourage primarily geologic sequestration, rather than the use of captured CO₂ to produce more oil.³⁴ As a result, the REPEAT model predicted that oil and gas production would decline as a result of the IRA.³⁵ As with other components of the REPEAT model, this prediction was proved wrong almost immediately. In 2024, oil and gas production was up 6.8 percent from 2022, making the U.S. the all-time largest producer of crude oil in the world.³⁶

This carbon capture vision failed to materialize. In July 2023, the REPEAT project released an updated report showing almost no additional CCS in 2024 but a large jump in 2025, to the roughly 50 million metric ton level.³⁷ While originally bullish on the possibility of CCS installation at coal- and gas-fired power plants (90 million tons of capture annually by 2030), even in the updated “optimistic” scenario, virtually no power plants are projected to use CCS through 2035.³⁸

In REPEAT’s May 2025 report, the organization further pushed back the start date for a power plant CCS boom, but continued to claim that around 100 million tons of CO₂ would be captured by power plants in 2035 if the 45Q tax credit (which provides money for CO₂ injected underground) remained intact.³⁹ REPEAT’s earlier prediction that gas production would decline is surprising, as carbon capture significantly increases fuel use at power plants to cover the energy needs of the capture equipment.⁴⁰ Less surprisingly, the American Gas Association has seized on the REPEAT modeling to celebrate the supposed role for fracked gas in reducing long-term emissions.⁴¹

In 2011, the Global CCS Institute (GCCII) claimed that around 150 million tons per year of carbon capture projects were in operation, construction, or development globally.⁴² However, the vast majority of this CCS capacity was in the “development” categories. By the GCCII’s own count, in 2023 this translated to less than 50 million tons per year of operational global CCS capacity.⁴³ Given the current state of CCS, it is unlikely that the GCCII’s 2010 prediction of 2,000 gigatons of CO₂ captured per year by 2030 will materialize.⁴⁴

The GCCII now touts the number of project announcements, even though it admits that “relatively few have yet advanced to operation.”⁴⁵ In the 2023 GCCII report, the first chart actually excludes operational CCS, showing a massive growth of CCS projects in “development and construction.”⁴⁶

Evaluating the predictions: CCS continues to disappoint

The CCS buildout has not lived up to expectations. A December 2023 U.S. Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report estimated 22.3 million metric tons of annual U.S. CCS capacity.⁴⁷ This closely matches the IEA’s CCS tracker estimates of 21.8 million metric tons.⁴⁸ These capacities are an overestimate of captured carbon because many projects are not operating at capacity due to persistent operational and economical challenges.⁴⁹ According to the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in 2023 only 16.1 million metric tons of CO₂ were captured, down nearly 28 percent from the 2019 peak.⁵⁰ As of September 2023, total U.S. CCS capacity — if run at maximum capacity — could capture only 0.4 percent of all U.S. emissions; all announced projects, if built, would capture only 3 percent.⁵¹

On the other hand, renewables are booming. Net generation from wind and solar power grew nearly eight-fold from 2010 to 2024, accounting for 17.5 percent of all electricity generated in the U.S. in 2024.⁵² In contrast to CCS, 81 percent of solar projects were on or ahead of schedule in 2023, and among the delayed projects most only suffered a delay of one to six months.⁵³ Battery storage capacity grew from 1.6 gigawatts (GW) in 2020 to 26 GW by the end of 2024. From 2021 to 2024, more than two-thirds of U.S. planned battery storage capacity was built.⁵⁴

The EOR “runway” myth

Much like the roundly debunked “bridge fuel” prediction that natural gas would pave the way for a transition from coal to renewable energy,⁵⁵ CCS proponents claimed that using CO₂ for oil production (a technique referred to as enhanced oil recovery or EOR) would help scale up carbon capture in the short term and improve the viability of pure sequestration in the long term.⁵⁶ In 2008, the environmental organization Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) promoted EOR as a great way to increase oil production.⁵⁷ In 2011, groups including CATF and NRDC, along with corporations such as Archer Daniels Midland and Arch Coal, participated in the National Enhanced Oil Recovery Initiative (NEORI).⁵⁸

NEORI argued that EOR deployment would lead to CCS cost reductions and create a national infrastructure that could be used beyond oilfields.⁵⁹ During the Obama administration, these groups promoted the idea that EOR could develop CCS technology and ultimately pave the way for CCS that does not involve oil production.⁶⁰

According to a December 2023 CBO report, nearly 95 percent of CCS capacity operating as of September 2023 provides CO₂ to oil producers for use in EOR.⁶¹ Only 11 percent of all produced and captured CO₂ in the U.S. in 2022 went to non-EOR applications, primarily food and beverage applications in which CO₂ is re-emitted to the atmosphere.⁶² Even as the transition to non-EOR CCS failed to emerge, CATF continued to claim that future projects may not follow the same trend.⁶³

To the extent that carbon capture has managed to scrape marginal amounts of the CO₂ from the waste streams of industrial facilities, it has served to prop up oil production and supplement natural sources of CO₂. In the last few years, traditional “domes” where naturally occurring CO₂ is mined for EOR have experienced contamination, production declines, and in one case near-total depletion.⁶⁴ Carbon capture also enables oil fields that lack pipelines to CO₂ domes to use EOR, further increasing oil production.⁶⁵

The Next Generation of Carbon Capture Is Following the Same Pattern of Failure

NET Power seems unlikely to revolutionize natural gas power plants

Gas-fired power plants have proven even more challenging ground for CCS than coal because of the highly diluted CO₂ exhaust stream.⁶⁶ A Food & Water Watch (FWW) analysis found that the increased methane emissions from producing additional natural gas to meet the high energy requirements for capturing CO₂ from natural gas combustion undermines the benefit of capturing those emissions. In fact, equipping fracked gas power plants with 90 percent effective carbon capture would lower their life-cycle emissions by only 18 percent, even assuming that the captured carbon emissions remain underground, which is dubious as best.⁶⁷

One proposed, theoretical, unproven technology is oxyfuel gas plants that use pure oxygen and natural gas as fuel. In theory, recirculating the CO₂-laden exhaust back into the system would raise the concentration of CO₂ in the eventual waste stream, reducing the typically significant amount of power required to purify the CO₂ for capture.⁶⁸ However, there is a chasm between the promises and track record of this technology. In 2013, the company NET Power announced plans to build a 50-megawatt pilot plant that would demonstrate the technology by 2015.⁶⁹ NET Power later claimed that the plant would be fully commissioned in 2017, but the pilot plant did not achieve grid synchronization until 2021.⁷⁰

By the end of 2023, NET Power’s demonstration plant still faced significant technological hurdles, which the company disclosed to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). “The NET Power Cycle has yet to be integrated with a combustion system and turbine operating coincidentally at target temperature and pressure,” the company disclosed, while including references to a new, custom-ordered part necessary to achieve the plant’s goals.⁷¹ Even more damning is the revelation that, “Our Demonstration Plant successfully generated electric power while synchronized to the grid, but it has not yet overcome all facility auxiliary power loads (pumps, compressors, etc.) to provide net positive power delivery to the commercial grid during its operation.”⁷² In other words, the plant

remained incapable of providing more power than it burned operating with its carbon capture technology.

In addition, the plant appears to be significantly over budget. When construction started, NET Power said that the pilot plant was a “\$140 million program,” but in a 2023 interview, the CEO described spending “a couple of hundred million dollars” on the project.⁷³ During the two years following grid synchronization, NET Power bragged of “over 1,500 hours of total facility runtime time,” but that is less than 10 percent of time over those two years.⁷⁴

NET Power’s announcement in May 2023 of a commercial-scale oxyfuel gas plant by 2026⁷⁵ is already behind schedule and over budget, with current cost estimates double what the company said in 2018 that a new plant would cost.⁷⁶ The plant’s technology is also significantly less efficient than was described in early media promises.⁷⁷ The CEO of NET Power concedes that even after reaching mass production, these plants will be 2.5 to 3.3 times as expensive as traditional gas plants.⁷⁸ Both wind and solar have comparable or lower lifetime costs to non-CCS natural gas power plants.⁷⁹ NET Power’s plant may have one dubious advantage over wind and solar: the company brags that when the plant works, the CO₂ is ready to be used for EOR without further compression.⁸⁰

Occidental’s renewed embrace of CCS mirrors an earlier failed bet on the technology

Occidental Petroleum has engaged in a public relations onslaught to define itself as a “net zero oil company,” including a branding deal to become the “preferred carbon removal partner” for the NFL football team the Texans.⁸¹ Occidental claims that it will build and operate 70 carbon capture facilities by 2035.⁸² While pitching itself as special among oil companies, Occidental remained clear that its views and positions were “generally consistent” with groups like the American Petroleum Institute and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.⁸³ The company simply supports CCS because it sees CCS as a way to keep burning oil and gas forever.⁸⁴

Central to Occidental’s climate-friendly image is a billion-dollar investment in the “world’s largest” direct air capture project, originally slated to be open in late 2024.⁸⁵ Although this project promises to capture 500,000 metric tons of CO₂ per year when built, eventually scaling up to 1 million tons, this is only 0.02 percent of U.S. CO₂ emissions.⁸⁶ As of August 2024, the project’s budget increased 30 percent from original estimates, and its opening had been pushed back to “mid 2025.”⁸⁷

This is not the first time Occidental has bet on CCS. The company’s Century natural gas processing plant was central to claims about the bright future for CCS. In 2010, Occidental’s business partner SandRidge bragged that the Century facility would be North America’s largest industrial CCS facility.⁸⁸ Built to supply Occidental with an additional source of CO₂, Occidental anticipated a large boost in oil production as a result of the new EOR.⁸⁹

Slated to open in late 2010,⁹⁰ the facility did not open until September 2012.⁹¹ From the beginning, SandRidge failed to make sufficient contractually obligated CO₂ deliveries to Occidental, resulting in penalties.⁹² By 2015, Occidental had written down most of the plant’s value in SEC filings.⁹³ The facility never recovered from this rough start. In 2022, Occidental sold the facility for less than the cost of building it, having never operated it at more than one-third of capacity.⁹⁴

The quest to build the “world’s largest” carbon capture project continues

In September 2022, CarbonCapture Inc. and Frontier Carbon Solutions announced “Project Bison,” a Wyoming direct air capture CCS facility that they claimed would be operational by late 2023 and capture 5 million metric tons of CO₂ from the air each year by 2030.⁹⁵ Just like Occidental, Project Bison could have become the “world’s largest” carbon capture facility of its type.⁹⁶ By June 2023, the company still had no employees in Wyoming.⁹⁷ Despite the mounting delays, CarbonCapture Inc. managed to attract an equity investment from Amazon.⁹⁸

Correspondence between CarbonCapture Inc. and the DOE obtained from a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request revealed that Project Bison relied heavily on additional speculative and expensive technologies such as small modular nuclear reactors, conversion of CO₂ to jet fuel, and blockchain tracking of emissions.⁹⁹ In addition to millions in DOE funding for engineering studies, the company sought funding through the separate carbon capture hub program.¹⁰⁰ However, less than two years after announcing the facility, CarbonCapture Inc. pulled the plug, citing an inability to source electricity amid competition from data centers and cryptocurrency miners.¹⁰¹

Clean coal projects continue to be unsuccessful

In New Mexico, a CCS project at the San Juan Generating Station was yet another failed attempt to build a “world’s largest” CCS project.¹⁰² Founded by an analyst and investor fired in 2012 for mooning his bosses,¹⁰³ the project’s backer Enchant Energy claimed that the project would become a model for other CCS projects across the western U.S.¹⁰⁴ Originally pitched in 2019 with a \$1.3 billion price tag,¹⁰⁵ the carbon capture system was supposed to be operational in 2023.¹⁰⁶ The project never made it past planning stages, and in late 2024 the plant was demolished.¹⁰⁷

One reason projects like this fail is that proposed CCS systems practically double the water needs of original coal plants.¹⁰⁸ While the company and the DOE spent \$29 million to study the feasibility of converting the plant to CCS,¹⁰⁹ miners and plant workers received only \$20 million in severance from the closing of the coal plant.¹¹⁰

The Fossil Fuel Industry Does Not Need CCS to Work – It Just Needs to Keep the Idea Alive

Even if CCS technology remains permanently stuck in the research, development, pilot, and announcement phases, it still serves an important function for corporate balance sheets heavy with dirty investments. In order to keep global temperature rise within 1.5 degrees Celsius, around 97 percent of global coal reserves, 81 percent of natural gas reserves, and 71 percent of oil reserves would need to remain unburned.¹¹¹ Fossil fuel infrastructure such as power plants and pipelines (expensive investments with long lifetimes) would also have to be closed early, erasing the value of the assets.¹¹² Carbon capture reassures investors and enables continued investment in fossil fuels without risking a sudden repricing of dirty assets.¹¹³

Carbon capture promises to save these investments from the threat of climate policy by resurrecting the “clean coal” narrative, painting them as “clean fossil fuels” that can be burned forever.¹¹⁴ According to Occidental’s CEO, “If it’s produced in the way that I’m talking about, there’s no reason not to produce oil and gas forever.”¹¹⁵ One oil driller claimed that direct air capture was like “draining

the ocean with a straw,” but praised the public relations benefit of the technology, saying, “let’s go run out there and build all these plants we can build to shut up whoever we need to shut up.”¹¹⁶

The promise of CCS also lets utility corporations claim that they are on track to meet commitments to achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions while continuing to open new gas-fired power plants.¹¹⁷ Industry associations like the American Gas Association (AGA) say that carbon capture equipment can be used on existing emitting infrastructure,¹¹⁸ cutting emissions without sacrificing current investments. The AGA highlights the promise of CCS to allow “the grid to lean even more on natural gas than it already does while continuing to lower emissions.”¹¹⁹

The fossil fuel industry and its allies are clear that any requirements to cut emissions must be accompanied with massive subsidies for CCS.¹²⁰ While publicly touting its company’s investment in carbon capture as proof of a commitment to addressing climate change, behind the closed doors of an oil and gas industry conference, an ExxonMobil lobbyist emphasized that carbon capture was about profit, not the environment.¹²¹ Chevron emphasizes that achieving net zero emissions is “not possible” without CCS and says that it can use carbon capture to reduce the carbon intensity of its current infrastructure.¹²²

CCS growth numbers are being juiced by rebranding fossil fuel infrastructure

While the fossil fuel industry has largely failed to develop large-scale carbon capture for facilities such as electric power plants, it has found growth for “CCS” by reclassifying existing activities as carbon capture with minimal physical changes. The EPA’s data reporting on CCS has enabled this deception, tricking observers by creating the appearance of a booming industry amid continued failure and stagnation. At the center of this deception is the following paradox: According to the EPA, between 2016 and 2023 annual carbon sequestration grew from 3.09 million metric tons to 16.3 million metric tons; however, carbon capture from industrial facilities declined over the same period from 17.2 million metric tons to 16.1 million metric tons.¹²³

One of the largest and oldest facilities often referred to as a carbon capture facility is ExxonMobil’s Shute Creek processing plant, which was built to refine natural gas, not reduce CO₂ emissions.¹²⁴ A closer examination of EPA-permitted CCS projects shows that many of the largest “carbon capture” projects are just redefined fossil fuel facilities.¹²⁵ Between 2016 and 2023, the number of Subpart UU facilities (a class of waste injection well) declined by 24 while the number of Subpart RR facilities (the EPA’s “sequestration” category) increased by 19. Over the same period, underground injection of CO₂ under Subpart UU declined by 17.4 million metric tons, more than the increase in Subpart RR “sequestration” during the same period.¹²⁶ Our analysis reveals that many of these “new” “sequestration” facilities simply changed their reporting classification.

A quirk in the EPA’s well permitting system creates the appearance of new sequestration at acid gas injection facilities

If someone only learned about CCS through industry hype, they would not know that most of the CO₂ that enters the CO₂ supply chain comes from underground, naturally occurring CO₂ reservoirs (as opposed to CO₂ released from combustion or industrial reactions).¹²⁷ Historically, oil and gas companies bought CO₂ for EOR from wells drilled into underground “domes” that contained nearly pure CO₂.¹²⁸ These domes still account for the majority of CO₂ sourced in the U.S., but the

subsidization of CCS has incentivized sourcing underground CO₂ from reservoirs that also contain fossil fuels.¹²⁹

In the U.S., some natural gas is pumped to the surface during extraction alongside impurities such as CO₂ and hydrogen sulfide (H₂S).¹³⁰ Natural gas processing plants remove the valuable hydrocarbons from this mixture, creating an “acid gas” waste stream consisting primarily of H₂S and CO₂, but with other impurities such as water, nitrogen, and light hydrocarbons.¹³¹ H₂S is regulated as a sulfur dioxide precursor and is frequently disposed of in underground injection wells alongside significant quantities of CO₂.¹³² As early as 2005, 20 of these sites injected acid gas for H₂S disposal.¹³³ In 2022, the natural gas processing sector disposed of or released 64 million pounds of H₂S.¹³⁴ These processing plants are not “capturing carbon” in the conventional sense; they are removing hydrocarbons from a naturally occurring mix of chemicals that they brought to the surface while extracting natural gas, some of which includes CO₂.

Natural gas processing plants can access the 45Q tax credit, which rewards CCS for each metric ton of CO₂ “sequestered” underground, potentially by “converting” existing acid gas injection (AGI) wells to “Subpart RR and 45Q.”¹³⁵ (The Subpart RR reporting category, for wells covered by the EPA’s Underground Injection Control portion of the Safe Drinking Water Act regulations, has become significant in the administration of tax credits for CCS.¹³⁶) For example, the Lucid Red Hills gas plant in the Permian Basin injects acid gas from natural gas processing and was originally built in 2012-2013.¹³⁷ The facility processes natural gas from Lea and Eddy counties in New Mexico.¹³⁸ Under the new permitting category, the Red Hills plant could count CO₂ injected into an existing well as “geologically sequestered,” and is also drilling a new CO₂ well.¹³⁹ Lucid claims that it applied for this rebrand in order to qualify for the 45Q tax credit.¹⁴⁰

Defining natural gas processing as “CCS” carries unique risks

The “natural” versus “captured” carbon distinction is further muddled when considering reinjected CO₂ for oil and gas production. For example, at Occidental’s Denver unit, when natural gas and natural gas liquids (NGLs) are coproduced with CO₂ and H₂S, the CO₂ is recycled back into the EOR process. In that case, the recycled CO₂ counts against the amount stored.¹⁴¹ However, if Occidental were to acquire CO₂ sourced from a non-EOR natural gas reservoir (such as the gas processed by the nearby Century Natural Gas Processing CCS plant that Occidental built in 2010 and owned until 2022), the coproduced “fresh” CO₂ would count as “geologically sequestered” (Subpart RR) upon injection.¹⁴²

The potential for double counting is further complicated by the use of CO₂ for enhanced natural gas recovery,¹⁴³ as well as when methane (and CO₂) is produced from reservoirs that previously underwent EOR.¹⁴⁴ In cases where CO₂ from nearby sources is reinjected for further gas or oil recovery, it may not be possible to distinguish between freshly extracted CO₂ and previously injected CO₂ because, at the molecular level, they have the same isotopic signatures (the primary way of tracking CO₂ leaks in CCS).¹⁴⁵ Generally, these isotope compositions correspond to the type of CO₂ source (combustion of oil versus steam methane reforming for hydrogen) rather than the specific well.¹⁴⁶ Researchers found that in Texas, the isotopic composition of CO₂ used in EOR and extracted at natural gas processing facilities is in the same range.¹⁴⁷ Practically speaking, all of this CO₂ started underground and was only brought to the surface because corporations drilled into it.

These natural gas processing facilities are often located in fossil fuel-producing areas. At Lucid's Red Hills processing plant, at the time of the CCS application, there were six active oil wells within one mile of Lucid's injection wells.¹⁴⁸ While monitoring plans aim to prevent the migration of CO₂ from injection sites to avoid re-extraction of injected CO₂,¹⁴⁹ by counting co-produced CO₂ as CCS, the possibility remains that the same molecule of CO₂ is extracted, re-injected, and later produced to be counted multiple times for 45Q tax credits.

The EPA's reporting system also sows confusion about EOR, the main use of CO₂

As carbon capture has largely failed to progress from the "stepping stone" of enhanced oil recovery, CCS proponents and the EPA have begun to describe CO₂ used to extract oil as "geologically sequestered."¹⁵⁰ Rather than advancing CCS technology or applying it to new settings, EOR has become another way to claim that CCS is growing by redefining a fossil fuel industry activity as CCS. Sequestration is a term that was historically distinct from EOR,¹⁵¹ but fossil fuel advocates sought to muddy the terminology by including EOR under the umbrella of "utilization," and trying to use a new acronym that includes this (CCUS or carbon capture, utilization and storage).¹⁵²

In an October 2023 update, the EPA's website proudly reported that in 2022, 7.95 million metric tons of CO₂ were "geologically sequestered"; however, the EPA did not make it clear that this includes EOR (and naturally occurring CO₂ received from CO₂ production wells).¹⁵³ While it lists EOR as a separate line in the same table, the table reflects two separate but overlapping data sets.¹⁵⁴ The EPA's current overview of CCS features a map that labels enhanced recovery and geologic sequestration separately, even though the "sequestration" in question is enhanced recovery.¹⁵⁵ As a result, a 2023 *Washington Post* article linking to the page claimed that only 60 percent of CO₂ captured from industrial facilities was used for EOR.¹⁵⁶

Part of the unrealistically low estimates of the portion of CCS dedicated to EOR arises from the misleading inclusion of the "food and beverage" category in the denominator.¹⁵⁷ These industries use CO₂ for refrigeration, stunning animals before killing them, and carbonation of beverages, among other uses.¹⁵⁸ CO₂ used for these purposes is emitted to the atmosphere,¹⁵⁹ and as a result these uses were specifically not considered to be part of CCS by early industry proponents.¹⁶⁰

Another problem is that the EPA bases these data on self-reporting of end uses from capture facilities in cases where an end use "is known."¹⁶¹ As a result, 25 percent of captured CO₂ is reported as having an "other" use, which the EPA says includes sequestration, EOR, and unknown.¹⁶² In fact, of the 16 million metric tons of CO₂ reported as "sequestered," 92 percent is used in enhanced recovery wells, and less than 5 percent is injected in dedicated storage facilities (the rest is injected in Class 2 disposal wells).¹⁶³ However, these data are also a flawed picture of the state of CCS, as they may include CO₂ that was produced rather than captured and later "sequestered."¹⁶⁴

In 2022, the two largest facilities in Subpart RR — misleadingly labeled "geological sequestration of carbon dioxide" by the EPA — were Occidental Petroleum facilities located in the heart of the Permian Basin.¹⁶⁵ Occidental's CEO described pure sequestration as "a waste of a valuable product."¹⁶⁶ The largest of these facilities, Occidental's West Texas "Denver Unit," uses CO₂ for

EOR in the Permian oil fields.¹⁶⁷ According to Occidental, the Denver unit had already “stored” 128.8 million metric tons of CO₂ from 1983 to 2013, before the monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) plan allowed a re-brand into a “Subpart RR” facility (the EPA requires facilities to submit information on geology, leak detection, and facility information in an MRV plan in order for a well to be permitted under Subpart RR).¹⁶⁸ That is nearly triple the total CO₂ reported across all years of the Subpart RR reporting nationally (46.75 million metric tons).¹⁶⁹ In fact, annual CO₂ “storage” at the facility appears to have peaked in the 1990s and has since declined.¹⁷⁰

The Main Tax Credit for CCS Is Ill-Equipped to Prevent Fraud and Ensure Long Term Storage

Congress has doubled down on 45Q, a tax credit with a terrible track record

The main tax credit for CCS is 45Q, which rewards corporations for each ton of CO₂ they inject underground. This program has a history of fraud and abuse, and there is limited publicly available information on the total value of the 45Q tax credit and on whether specific facilities can claim the credit.¹⁷¹ A 2020 Treasury Department Inspector General investigation found that nearly \$1 billion in 45Q credits had been improperly claimed without meeting the EPA’s requirements for storage and monitoring. In other words, corporations claimed the credits without proof that the CO₂ was effectively stored.¹⁷²

In the years since this investigation, Congress increased the value of the 45Q credit from \$50 to \$85 per metric ton of geologic sequestration, and from \$35 to \$60 per metric ton used in EOR. It also added a direct pay option, allowing companies to receive the 45Q “credit” without corresponding tax liability.¹⁷³ The “Big Ugly Bill” of July 2025 erased the distinction between EOR and sequestration, raising the value of CO₂ used in EOR to \$85 per ton.¹⁷⁴ Agencies have also weakened some of the requirements to qualify for the credit.¹⁷⁵ The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) now only requires that companies pay back 45Q credits on CO₂ leaks occurring within three years after they claim the credit.¹⁷⁶ While the CO₂ would need to remain stored for thousands of years to have a climate benefit, corporations can keep 45Q credits for carbon that only stays in the ground for four years.¹⁷⁷

No single government organization has full access to the data used to oversee the 45Q program. The EPA does not implement 45Q and has no access to taxpayer data.¹⁷⁸ However, the IRS relies on the EPA by requiring capturing companies to submit their Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program identification numbers and the volumes of CO₂ injected by their operations.¹⁷⁹ Corporations can then self-certify volumes of CO₂ reported for 45Q that they also report to the EPA under Subpart RR.¹⁸⁰ Alternatively, companies can instead choose to avoid the EPA entirely by claiming 45Q through a separate (ANSI) certification process.¹⁸¹

While the EPA certification process is vulnerable to fraud and abuse, allowing CCS operators to sidestep the EPA and use the ANSI certification process is a recipe for disaster.¹⁸² This process allows companies to hire their own experts without approval from the EPA and with no oversight from regulators.¹⁸³ The EPA requires reporting of CO₂ covered this way, but it does not approve these plans or cooperate with the IRS to verify the 45Q credit.¹⁸⁴ During an audit, the IRS, not the EPA, would review these third-party materials.¹⁸⁵

Fossil fuel corporations have already succeeded in removing key guardrails from the 45Q program

The “date of construction” rule highlights how fossil fuel corporations leverage an army of lawyers, lobbyists, and accountants to secure counter-intuitive but lucrative interpretations of tax laws. Theoretically, values for the 45Q tax credit are tied to the date that the capture equipment was built, with capture equipment constructed before 2023 ineligible for the increased value of the credit, and facilities placed into service before February 8, 2018 no longer eligible.¹⁸⁶ (According to the U.S. Tax Code, pre-2018 facilities cannot claim 45Q after a total of 75 million metric tons of credits are claimed [a cap reached in 2022] or January 1, 2023, whichever comes first.)¹⁸⁷ In addition to ensuring that old carbon capture equipment does not receive a windfall from the new credits, they are tied to labor standards that older construction may not have met.¹⁸⁸

However, the IRS 80/20 rule creates a pathway for old facilities to claim that their carbon capture equipment entered service more recently.¹⁸⁹ Old facilities can move up their official start date so long as the “fair market value” of their used carbon capture components is not more than 20 percent of the total value of all carbon capture equipment (even including related infrastructure such as pipelines).¹⁹⁰ The use of fair market value means that the new investment can be a lower dollar value than the original investment,¹⁹¹ and it could also be the case that the market value of the original property is contingent on whether it qualifies for the 45Q tax credit.

According to reporting by E&E News, the Petra Nova CCS coal plant restarted in 2023 partly due to higher 45Q credits.¹⁹² Petra Nova’s construction was completed in 2017,¹⁹³ but the project was such a failure that in 2022, NRG Energy sold its 50 percent stake for \$3.6 million, down from the \$1 billion spent to build the project (including an \$190 million grant from the DOE).¹⁹⁴ At this valuation, Petra Nova would require only \$28.8 million in new investment to move up its construction date and potentially qualify for 45Q credits worth \$63 million per year.¹⁹⁵

New converts to “carbon capture” are also under the impression that their old facilities qualify for 45Q credits. The passage of the IRA and promulgation of IRS rules that allow companies to self-certify volumes of CO₂ covered by the EPA’s Subpart RR program likely led to a surge in applications for approval of new MRV plans to access 45Q credits.¹⁹⁶ Applications rose significantly in the wake of these new rules and the increase in the value of the tax credit.¹⁹⁷ Many of these are natural gas processing plants that are engaged in acid gas disposal.¹⁹⁸ The IRS has previously ruled that these acid gas removal systems (acid gas is the carbon component of natural gas processing) count as carbon capture equipment for purposes of construction year, even if the carbon was emitted to the atmosphere.¹⁹⁹

Many of these facilities were built before 2018. For example, Lucid’s Red Hills acid gas injection system, built in 2012-2013, submitted MRV documents with the goal of accessing 45Q credits.²⁰⁰ Scout Energy submitted an MRV for EOR in Colorado to obtain 45Q credits despite using CO₂ from ExxonMobil’s Shute Creek facility, one of the oldest CCS facilities in

the country.²⁰¹ Scout Energy bought these oil fields from Chevron, which had been doing EOR there since the 1980s.²⁰² Another corporation, Frontier, also aims to get 45Q credits from acid gas injection at two older natural gas processing plants.²⁰³

45Q relies on the IRS for environmental oversight despite inadequate resources

Confidentiality rules limit cross-agency collaboration and verification.²⁰⁴ While the IRS has broader access to confidential taxpayer information, it does not have the same expertise in environmental compliance as the EPA, while the EPA does not coordinate with the IRS in verification of 45Q claims.²⁰⁵ The EPA says that greenhouse gas reporting data were never designed or accumulated for use in taxes.²⁰⁶

This gap is evident in the tracking of CO₂ for 45Q. While companies can self-certify the volumes of CO₂ that they report in Subpart RR, Subpart RR does not distinguish between 45Q qualified sources of CO₂ (captured from eligible industrial facilities) and other sources (recycled from EOR, produced from natural reservoirs).²⁰⁷ Oil companies are asking the IRS to further loosen the rules and clarify that CO₂ should be treated as fungible, not tracked from source to disposal.²⁰⁸ This would mean that so long as a capture facility was hooked up to the same pipeline as a sequestration well, it could contract to claim 45Q credits even if the actual injected CO₂ was from a pure CO₂ well.²⁰⁹

Well-resourced fossil fuel corporations are up against a weakened IRS. While the IRS received an influx of funding during the Biden administration from the IRA, the agency is firmly in the crosshairs of the Trump administration, as Trump's pick to lead the IRS co-sponsored legislation to abolish the IRS.²¹⁰ One of the administration's first executive orders was to institute a federal hiring freeze, which is temporary for all agencies except for the IRS, where the freeze is indefinite.²¹¹ The IRS hiring freeze is exacerbated by Trump's threats to fire IRS workers and reverse the IRA funding while also attempting to re-assign IRS employees to immigration enforcement.²¹² Even at current funding levels, the IRS fails to collect \$696 billion per year in unpaid taxes.²¹³

Paying to Pollute: 45Q Rewards Corporations for Finding New Sources of CO₂ to Capture

Corporations are cashing in on naturally occurring CO₂

Providing money for emissions capture creates a perverse incentive. Corporations might get into the pollution creation business just to bank tax credits when they capture that new pollution. For this reason, the 45Q program as initially promulgated was supposed to exclude "a facility that produces CO₂ from CO₂ production wells at natural CO₂-bearing formations."²¹⁴ The goal was to limit tax credits to CO₂ "that, absent capture and disposal, would otherwise be released into the atmosphere."²¹⁵ However, as this report shows, a large portion of CCS, including some of the largest operational CCS facilities, violate or exist in the gray area of these provisions.

As early as 2010, natural gas processing facilities, capturing essentially natural CO₂, claimed that they qualified for CCS tax credits.²¹⁶ While the EPA and IRS often refer to these facilities as "industrial carbon capture," a category that meets 45Q requirements,²¹⁷ even CCS advocacy

organizations sometimes describe these facilities as capturing “naturally occurring CO₂.”²¹⁸ Following pressure to erase the distinction between natural and anthropogenic CO₂, in 2021 the IRS ruled that the prohibition on natural CO₂ applied only to wells that extract more than 90 percent CO₂ by volume.²¹⁹ The IRS also created an exception allowing facilities that “capture” naturally occurring CO₂ from reservoirs that are above 90 percent CO₂ so long as there is also a commercially viable non-CO₂ product present in the reservoir and the project is not dependent on credits for viability.²²⁰ For reservoirs that are less than 90 percent CO₂ by volume, 45Q credits can be the primary motivation for extraction.²²¹

In this context, one concern is that CO₂ could migrate underground and be produced by neighboring wells that do not monitor the total mass of CO₂ in their reservoirs.²²² The IRS forbids double claiming 45Q on re-extracted CO₂ used for EOR,²²³ but if the CO₂ migrates to a nearby reservoir with a similar isotopic carbon signature and noble gas composition (perhaps because the nearby reservoir is the original source of the CO₂), tracing techniques could fail to distinguish previously and newly produced CO₂.²²⁴ Moreover, IRS provisions for repayment of tax credits on CO₂ apply only to CO₂ that is deliberately extracted or escapes to the atmosphere, not CO₂ that migrates.²²⁵

ExxonMobil’s Shute Creek facility highlights a potentially lucrative business strategy

In 2021, ExxonMobil touted its Shute Creek facility in Wyoming as the largest carbon capture facility in the world.²²⁶ Built in 1986 and expanded by adding an acid gas injection well in 2005, the facility’s 2005 10-K filing does not mention CCS, describing the natural gas processing plant as merely another gas processing and acid gas injection project.²²⁷ The facility began acid gas injection in 2005, incidentally injecting CO₂ because the facility processes gas that is 66 percent CO₂ and only 21 percent methane.²²⁸ However, ExxonMobil had to remove the naturally occurring CO₂ in order to market the natural gas, and by 2009 the company provided around 4 to 5 million metric tons of CO₂ annually for EOR.²²⁹ As of 2018, ExxonMobil still sold most of the CO₂ to nearby oilfields for EOR.²³⁰ The company only injects some of the naturally produced CO₂ — injecting gas that has a significantly higher H₂S concentration than the extracted gas — and sells or emits the rest.²³¹ The acid gas is injected into the same geologic formation that natural gas is produced from, albeit at a different location.²³²

Reinjecting produced CO₂ for tax credits creates the risk that companies begin producing otherwise unprofitable CO₂-rich gas, injecting only a portion and emitting the rest. At ExxonMobil’s Shute Creek facility, every cubic foot of methane is extracted alongside 3.14 cubic feet of CO₂.²³³ At 2024 prices, one cubic foot of natural gas sold at the main natural gas market was worth \$0.0023, while each cubic foot of CO₂ used for EOR at a new CCS project is worth \$.0044 per cubic foot.²³⁴ A newly built facility that extracted a similar ratio of CO₂ to natural gas as Shute Creek and injected CO₂ for EOR would make 6.1 times as much money from the CO₂ tax credits as from selling natural gas.²³⁵ A 2014 DOE report explicitly analyzed this reservoir as a naturally occurring source of CO₂, finding that 52 trillion cubic feet (2.7 billion metric tons) of CO₂ could be profitably produced if sold for \$20 per ton, a fraction of the gas’s value if injected to get 45Q tax credits.²³⁶

Providing 45Q for enhanced oil recovery is a fossil fuel subsidy

According to an industry consultant, in 2022 EOR was used to produce an additional 88.2 million barrels of oil.²³⁷ The EPA says that 36.7 million metric tons of CO₂ were “used” in EOR (although only 19 percent of that CO₂ met the EPA’s “sequestration” criteria).²³⁸ That means that every ton of CO₂ injected for EOR produces 2.4 barrels of oil, which when burned emits more CO₂ than was injected.²³⁹ In recent years, oil production per metric ton of CO₂ used in EOR has increased.²⁴⁰ A U.S. Geological Survey study of future EOR potential found that an average of 3.5 barrels of oil is produced per metric ton of CO₂ “stored”; if burned, this oil would emit 1.5 tons of CO₂ for every ton injected.²⁴¹

45Q heavily subsidizes this process. At 2022 rates of CO₂ use per barrel of oil produced, 45Q would be worth around 37 percent of the average sale price of a barrel of oil.²⁴² This oil also contains potentially valuable CO₂. A single barrel of oil when burned emits 0.43 metric tons of CO₂.²⁴³ If captured, this CO₂ would be worth \$36.55 in 45Q credits — 48 percent of the cost of the oil sold on the market.²⁴⁴ Now that EOR receives the same value as sequestration,²⁴⁵ fossil fuel lobbyists get their wish and can ensure that CO₂ is not diverted to sequestration.²⁴⁶

Subsidizing CCS creates a risk that corporations will burn fossil fuels just to capture the new CO₂ that they create

While the IRS nominally restricts the extraction of purely naturally occurring CO₂ for CCS, it does nothing to limit another natural source of CO₂ ripe for extraction: the carbon bound up in fossil fuels. Just as 45Q incentivizes corporations to extract extra naturally occurring CO₂, the credit also subsidizes overproduction of other fossil fuels in order to harvest their lucrative carbon emissions (assuming they manage to get failed carbon capture technology to work).

In 2024, coal-fired power plants paid an average of \$2.55 per million Btu of coal.²⁴⁷ That much coal, when burned, will emit CO₂ worth up to \$8.14 if captured.²⁴⁸ In other words, carbon capture plants could buy coal just to burn it, capture half of their emissions, and make a profit. Additionally, regional coal prices can be as low as \$0.81 per million per Btu, leading to an even stronger incentive for some carbon capture operations.²⁴⁹ Some electricity markets feature marginal price dispatch, which means that power plants turn on in the order of their cost to operate.²⁵⁰ Sufficient subsidies can push the cost to operate toward the negative side, meaning that CCS-equipped coal plants could potentially displace renewable energy even when there is abundant wind and sun.²⁵¹ Of course, this assumes that the CCS plant is not facing technical problems that plague carbon capture equipment.²⁵²

The 45Q tax credit also creates the possibility of this effect in natural gas markets. In 2024, natural gas-fired power plants paid \$3.03 per million Btu of natural gas.²⁵³ If burned, this gas contains carbon worth up to \$4.50 in 45Q credits.²⁵⁴ However, this is a national average, including the costs that power plants must pay for transportation to locations far from the wellhead. Henry Hub (the primary U.S. spot market for natural gas) prices in 2024 averaged \$2.19 per million Btu, low enough to support an “extract to recapture” business model.²⁵⁵

Utility corporations are already choosing coal with CCS over renewables

A 2020 report commissioned by the Wyoming governor found that the 45Q tax credit incentivized replacing wind, solar, and battery storage with coal carbon capture, even though those coal plants would not capture all of their emissions.²⁵⁶ Whether or not these cost projections pan out, 45Q is partially responsible for leading Wyoming to pursue costly carbon capture mandates in lieu of renewables.²⁵⁷ Western utilities in Utah and Wyoming (near the cheapest coal sources) have already begun cutting back on planned renewables and storage in favor of CCS.²⁵⁸

Enchant Energy's failed plan to re-open and CCS retrofit the San Juan Generating Station coal plant in New Mexico projected receiving up to twice as much revenue from 45Q credits as from electricity sales.²⁵⁹ After including revenue from selling CO₂ for oil production, Enchant projected receiving between 1.4 and 3.3 times its electricity revenue from CO₂.²⁶⁰ In fact, Enchant bragged that it could pay for the capture project with the tax credits and CO₂ revenue.²⁶¹ That means Enchant wouldn't even rely on actually selling electricity. While nearly one-third of the electricity from the plant would go to running the power-hungry carbon capture equipment, Enchant characterized the carbon capture system as an "anchor customer."²⁶² For Enchant, this project represented a "model" for the CCS industry.²⁶³

Failures like Enchant's reflect that carbon capture is significantly more likely at totally new facilities, despite messaging about the value of CCS retrofits. Old power plants tend to inefficiently convert fuel to power, which means increasing fuel use substantially to run the capture system, and the site may not have room.²⁶⁴ Adding carbon capture to older plants approaches the cost of building power plants from scratch.²⁶⁵ That means that CCS facilities primarily compete with wind, solar, and batteries — the newly built forms of electricity capacity (comprising 94 percent of new capacity in 2024).²⁶⁶

Direct air capture creates more emissions than it captures

Even the "purest" forms of CCS face a similar, if more diffuse, form of perverse incentive. Occidental's plans for a million metric ton per year direct air capture plant would capture carbon extracted from the earth and released into the air from combustion.²⁶⁷ However, generating electricity required to run direct air capture equipment would create more greenhouse gas emissions than the CO₂ captured by the equipment. According to calculations by FWW, capturing one ton of CO₂ from the atmosphere using electricity from fossil fuels would create greenhouse gas emissions equivalent to 3.5 tons of CO₂. Using enough electricity from the U.S. grid to capture one ton of CO₂ from the air would be responsible for the equivalent of 2.2 tons of CO₂ emissions.²⁶⁸

While using electricity from renewable energy could theoretically avoid this problem, that would involve building out a massive amount of clean energy just to support continuing to extract and burn fossil fuels. It is far more advantageous to simply shift our grid from fossil fuels to renewable energy. For instance, replacing natural gas with renewables in the electrical grid avoids three times the amount of greenhouse gas emissions than could be captured by a direct air capture facility powered by renewable electricity.²⁶⁹

CCS Also Benefits From Lax Regulation and Easy Access to Government Support

The light regulatory touch of the 45Q program is not atypical for CCS. As the technological development of CCS has stalled, proponents have continued to ask for yet more exemptions and regulatory favors that are supposedly necessary to let the technology flourish.

Only a fraction of CCS activities fall under EPA regulation

The EPA only regulates carbon sequestration through the Underground Injection Control (UIC) program of the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA).²⁷⁰ The SDWA UIC program is concerned with protecting underground sources of drinking water and preventing contamination.²⁷¹ Other laws primarily regulate hazardous waste. For example, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) regulates hazardous waste across transport, treatment, and disposal, applying a cradle-to-grave framework that tracks waste from source through every phase of management.²⁷² CO₂, when injected into a Class VI well permitted under the SDWA UIC program, is exempt from RCRA.²⁷³ Releases from UIC program-permitted wells are typically exempt from other forms of regulation such as the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), which would otherwise apply to releases of hazardous substances and community notification and emergency planning regulations.²⁷⁴

Even on its own terms, SDWA regulation of carbon sequestration has numerous flaws, particularly in the identification and management of pre-existing wells. For example, monitoring wells for testing carbon leakage have no associated federal permitting regime and in many cases are drilled without any state permitting structure.²⁷⁵ Abandoned, unpermitted test wells are more likely to go unnoticed when evaluating storage areas for leakage risks, as permitting databases are an important source of information for finding abandoned wells.²⁷⁶ In some cases, MRV plans allow the reclassification of existing wells as carbon sequestration wells without any modifications to the materials or construction of the well.²⁷⁷

Identifying old wells and using CO₂-specific materials in construction is necessary to avoid CO₂ leaks. Since many storage locations are in and around fossil fuel reservoirs, abandoned oil and gas wellbores provide a pathway for CO₂ leaking to the surface.²⁷⁸ Any old, unsealed, or defectively sealed wells are essentially pipelines to the surface.²⁷⁹ CO₂ can also slowly escape along well linings and has been shown to corrode materials used in well casings and seals.²⁸⁰

The EPA has also delegated authority (known as granting primacy) over the regulation of Class VI wells (wells used for geologic sequestration of CO₂) to fossil fuel-producing states such as Louisiana, North Dakota, and Wyoming, to the cheers of the fossil fuel industry.²⁸¹ Primacy involves turning over to states the day-to-day responsibility for granting permits, monitoring compliance, and leading enforcement.²⁸² In this context, granting primacy to industry-friendly states is a fundamentally deregulatory measure, carrying risks like lower environmental penalties and lax enforcement responsibilities in an attempt to appease industry groups and attract investment.²⁸³ CCS proponents and the fossil fuel industry are pushing for the EPA to approval additional state primacy requests.²⁸⁴

Poor oversight of pipeline construction is a recipe for disaster

The other key area of CCS regulation is pipelines. According to some projections, a CCS buildout could involve 65,000 miles of carbon pipelines, but the regulatory framework for pipelines is grossly inadequate.²⁸⁵ Carbon pipelines are regulated federally by the Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA).²⁸⁶ Following the 2020 carbon pipeline rupture in Sartartia, Mississippi, the PHMSA committed to issuing regulations that covered the specific dangers of CO₂ pipelines. But the Biden administration's DOT delayed the rulemaking, proposing the rules only four days before Trump assumed office — far too late to shield the rules from withdrawal and rollback.²⁸⁷

The PHMSA sets standards for the construction of pipelines, but companies are allowed to start construction without agency approval.²⁸⁸ Pipeline construction is almost entirely overseen by private inspectors hired by the pipeline developer.²⁸⁹ Developers frequently ignore safety warnings identified by inspectors, who can be fired for rocking the boat.²⁹⁰ The PHMSA primarily relies on corporations to oversee pipeline operation and self-report data.²⁹¹

Even when inspectors do report concerns to the PHMSA, the administration does not always adequately investigate or follow up on safety problems.²⁹² The PHMSA prefers to encourage companies to make repairs rather than fining companies upon discovery of unsafe pipelines.²⁹³ The PHMSA assessed just \$12.6 million in fines in 2023, a fraction of the \$6.5 billion worth of natural gas pipelines currently under construction.²⁹⁴ This process is theoretically overseen by the PHMSA, but the agency has a tiny number of inspectors, incapable of adequately monitoring a massive buildout of CO₂ pipelines.²⁹⁵ The PHMSA routinely struggles to hire inspectors, as they must compete with the higher-paying private sector for employees.²⁹⁶

Department of Energy CCS grants have a long history of embarrassing scandals

The façade of a future carbon capture economy is propped up by ever increasing research and development funding, touting impressive-sounding projects that invariably fail to pan out. Between 2011 and 2023, the federal government spent \$16.9 billion on research and development of CCS.²⁹⁷ From 2022 to 2024, the DOE spent more than \$7.3 billion on CCS.²⁹⁸

Unfortunately, the size of this federal largess has not been matched by oversight or proper procedures at the DOE. Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports on the DOE's handling of CCS dating back to the George W. Bush administration detail basic math errors, not requiring congressionally mandated cost-sharing, and continuing to fund projects even after they missed targets and violated DOE agreements.²⁹⁹ A 2024 GAO investigation found that the DOE's risk management and selection processes for carbon capture funding were inconsistent and did not always meet the basic thresholds set by the agency.³⁰⁰ Despite previous GAO reports documenting serious mishandling of CCS funding, years later the DOE has still not fully implemented recommendations.³⁰¹

The Trump administration's moves to dismantle the administrative state will make adequate oversight even less likely. Despite promises to combat fraud and waste, the administration has instead fired internal government watchdogs responsible for investigating agency misconduct.³⁰²

The Trump administration has also cut about 25 percent of the DOE staff responsible for overseeing loans to energy projects.³⁰³

The carbon capture industry wants even more deregulation and public funding

Despite the extensive regulatory leeway granted to the CCS industry, CCS boosters are asking for even more support.³⁰⁴ According to CCS advocates, the current regulatory framework is insufficiently supportive of CCS and will not allow CCS to be deployed fast enough to meet their goals.³⁰⁵ They also want to increase spending on CCS, claiming that products made from captured carbon cannot compete without additional subsidies.³⁰⁶

CCS proponents admit that CCS facilities will not continue to operate after the 12 years of 45Q eligibility are up; in order to keep these facilities open, the 45Q tax credit will need to be made permanent.³⁰⁷ In addition, proponents have supported redefining existing waste injection wells as “CCS” and want the EPA to provide explicit guidance for the reclassification of Class II wells (wells used for EOR or waste disposal) to Class VI wells.³⁰⁸ Congress did the industry an even bigger favor and simply raised the value of 45Q used in EOR to the sequestration value.³⁰⁹ Despite this change, the industry continues to complain that the 45Q tax credit is insufficiently generous.³¹⁰

CCS proponents are also interested in yet more “permitting reform” for CCS.³¹¹ Rather than strengthening PHMSA enforcement and inspection, permitting reform in Congress is focused on speeding up the approval of pipelines.³¹² The pro-CCS Nature Conservancy supports opening federal lands to carbon injection, granting primacy to states for Class VI wells, and avoiding “permitting delays” to ensure rapid development of CCS.³¹³

Despite claims that they are committed to long-term secure storage, the CCS industry does not want to be on the hook for long-term liability associated with their facilities. For example, the Carbon Free Technology Institute (CFTI) wants the federal government to assume long-term liability for closed carbon storage facilities.³¹⁴ Even the Global CCS Institute acknowledges that the kind of liability immunity demanded by storage facilities is “exceedingly rare” in the treatment of industrial liability.³¹⁵ However, some CCS advocates want states to assume responsibility for all leakage liability immediately after the injection ends.³¹⁶

What’s Next for CCS: Support for Dirty, Dead-End Industries with Easy Alternatives

CCS is poorly suited for genuinely “hard-to-abate” emissions

While CCS proponents tend to emphasize the importance of CCS for “hard-to-abate” industries,³¹⁷ in practice, the future of carbon capture is primarily in dirty, dead-end industries with easy alternatives.³¹⁸ Other, more speculative proposals lean on CCS in an attempt to paper over serious problems with other flawed technologies such as biofuels and cryptocurrency. Some definitions of “hard to abate” include a huge range of sectors, even mentioning electric power and refining.³¹⁹

Generally, it is harder to capture CO₂ that is less concentrated in lower-pressure exhaust streams, a central challenge for genuinely hard-to-abate industries.³²⁰ Steel, cement, and iron have very diluted carbon emission streams, making carbon capture challenging.³²¹ While carbon-free steel production methods need new research and development, some methods show promise. In 2013, researchers

at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology laid the groundwork for an affordable, entirely electrified, carbon emission-free steel production technique.³²² Another method uses renewably produced hydrogen to produce steel from iron.³²³

Carbon capture in the cement industry faces unique challenges, with carbon capture technologies that are capable of reducing emissions by more than 64 percent still at the prototype stage.³²⁴ Alternative cement production methods and products are still undergoing research, but several carbon-free options appear viable.³²⁵

Natural gas processing remains a likely industry of interest for CCS

Natural gas processing facilities are poised to continue benefiting from CCS subsidies. There are additional acid gas injection wells and natural gas processing facilities that have not yet made the permitting rebrand to CCS.³²⁶ It is likely that this industry will attempt to access 45Q given that it is possible to do so with almost no commitment of new infrastructure.³²⁷

Natural gas processing is a dead-end industry. The major uses of natural gas are for energy in buildings (easily electrified), generation of electricity (easily replaced with renewables and storage), and industrial use.³²⁸ Natural gas is used by industrial facilities both as a heat source and as a feedstock.³²⁹ Several technologies allow electricity to directly generate process heat, and natural gas's primary use as a feedstock is through the creation of hydrogen, which can be replaced by electrolysis.³³⁰

Dirty hydrogen production will continue to funnel money to the oil industry

Another sector that will likely see new carbon capture investment is facilities that produce hydrogen from natural gas (called “blue hydrogen” when paired with CCS).³³¹ The leading uses of hydrogen are for oil refining (68 percent) and for producing nitrogen fertilizers (21 percent).³³² Hydrogen is used at oil refineries to change the composition of fuel (primarily by removing sulfur), so any CCS subsidy for blue hydrogen would likely directly fund an existing oil industry activity.³³³

Carbon capture providers justify blue hydrogen at oil refineries by saying that oil refining is a “hard-to-abate” sector and thus needs fossil fuels.³³⁴ However, producing hydrogen from electricity and water is a well-established technology.³³⁵ The actual appeal of blue hydrogen is that the process emissions from steam methane reformation contain a high concentration of CO₂ that is comparatively cheaper to capture than other CO₂ emissions.³³⁶ However, these process emissions account for only around two-thirds of emissions, the rest of which are much harder to capture and are simply emitted at “blue hydrogen” facilities.³³⁷

Some blue hydrogen CCS facilities do not even capture all the process emissions, pushing the facility capture rate below 50 percent.³³⁸ Even if blue hydrogen facilities did manage to capture the energy emissions at steam methane reformation facilities, the natural gas used at these facilities has persistent upstream methane emissions that almost fully offset the emissions reductions from carbon capture.³³⁹

It is also not clear that there is any need to decarbonize oil refineries by incorporating any form of hydrogen. The vast majority of output at oil refineries is fuel for surface transportation.³⁴⁰ Since battery electric vehicles are well equipped to replace this use entirely, the best decarbonization pathway for refineries is likely closure.³⁴¹

Among the speculative hydrogen CCS applications are proposals to create synthetic fuels, potentially using a combination of captured CO₂ and blue hydrogen.³⁴² Of particular interest is methanol, a toxic gas that CCS boosters hope to use for shipping fuel.³⁴³ Theoretically, hydrogen producers could create methanol by combining captured CO₂ with hydrogen made from natural gas.³⁴⁴ Methanol has been a favorite alternative fuel of D.C. lobbyists and insiders dating back to the 1980s.³⁴⁵

Plans are in the works to revive a previously failed carbon capture equipped methanol production factory at Lake Charles, Louisiana.³⁴⁶ Originally proposed in 2007, the project has, according to local media, “had at least five or six name changes.”³⁴⁷ In 2009, Louisiana Senator J. Bennet Johnson described the facility as “shovel ready.”³⁴⁸ The project planned to use the CO₂ for EOR, and despite receiving \$12.7 million from the DOE, backers cancelled it in 2015.³⁴⁹ In 2016, a new iteration of Lake Charles methanol production secured \$2 billion in conditional loan guarantees from the DOE, promising commercial operation by 2019.³⁵⁰

In February 2024, Lake Charles Methanol II LLC and the Louisiana Economic Development office issued a press release announcing a “new” \$3.2 billion methanol plant in the same location.³⁵¹ The press release touted the millions in tax handouts that the project would receive from the state.³⁵² In May 2025, the Lake Charles Methanol II website claimed that the project would begin construction in 2025, with a \$5 billion price tag.³⁵³ By September of 2025 the company’s website claimed that the project would start construction in the second quarter of 2026 and cost an unspecified billions of dollars.³⁵⁴

In addition to the problems faced by using carbon capture for hydrogen production, methanol is energy intensive and expensive to produce.³⁵⁵ It still releases pollution when burned, such as a relatively high level of formaldehyde.³⁵⁶

Ethanol refineries can cash in big on small CCS investments

Ethanol refineries continue to be among the most rapid adopters of CCS.³⁵⁷ Highly concentrated ethanol fermentation emissions represent lower-hanging fruit for capture, which many ethanol plants were capturing long before rebranding it “CCS.”³⁵⁸ The capture systems at these refineries dehydrate and compress a stream of 99 percent pure CO₂ that is a byproduct of fermenting corn ethanol.³⁵⁹

However, the typical ethanol refinery only captures the emissions that are a byproduct of the fermentation process, leaving a wide range of uncaptured emissions from ethanol production.³⁶⁰ And this is an even smaller portion of the overall emissions³⁶¹ from a fuel that, when burned, will emit CO₂.³⁶² Even ethanol producers admit that the technology to capture these other emissions “doesn’t exist.”³⁶³

When assessing the fuel’s climate impact, refining ethanol only accounts for a fraction of overall emissions.³⁶⁴ Fuel and feedstock transport, agricultural emissions, and land use change all contribute to the lifecycle greenhouse gas footprint.³⁶⁵ Accounting for land use changes, ethanol has lifecycle emissions that are likely at least 24 percent higher than fossil fuel-derived gasoline.³⁶⁶ Ethanol also increases the overall supply of gasoline available to burn, leading to increased consumption and leaving oil that can still be burned later.³⁶⁷

Heavy adoption of biofuels with or without CCS would have serious consequences.³⁶⁸ Deriving less than 10 percent of global energy from the most efficient biofuel sources would require between 11 and 14 percent of arable land and 18 to 25 percent of current human water consumption.³⁶⁹ Heavy use of biofuels could require up to 80 percent of current cropland.³⁷⁰ As a result, biofuels raise food prices.³⁷¹

Sustainable aviation fuel will likely augment demand for ethanol CCS

Another greenwashing effort that aims to incorporate CCS is called “sustainable aviation fuel” (SAF).³⁷² The airline industry association the International Air Transport Association (IATA) is counting on SAF for the bulk of the aviation industry’s emission cuts.³⁷³ The IRA created a credit worth between \$1.25 and 1.75 per gallon for SAF that successfully claims a greenhouse gas footprint at least 50 percent lower than conventional jet fuel.³⁷⁴ The Biden administration’s energy policy targeted producing a minimum of 3 billion gallons of SAF per year by 2030 and 35 billion gallons per year by 2050.³⁷⁵ In tax credits, that could be worth nearly eight times the U.S. airline industry’s 2023 post-tax profits.³⁷⁶

The IATA claims that SAF will not be generated from food crops or produced on newly cultivated farmland.³⁷⁷ Americans for Clean Aviation Fuels — a group that includes BP, Exxon, Delta, and the Iowa Soybean Association — advocates for “feedstock neutral” policies that will raise corn income.³⁷⁸ Ethanol refiners are itching to tap into this lucrative market, producing SAF from conventional corn ethanol with a splash of CCS.³⁷⁹ IRS rules governing the distribution of IRA credits allow ethanol to qualify.³⁸⁰

Promises of CCS in press releases are useful for greenwashing datacenters

Growing demand for data centers to train artificial intelligence is projected to massively increase U.S. emissions.³⁸¹ This data center boom has led utilities to double down on new gas infrastructure and delay retirements.³⁸² It is also generating renewed interest in CCS as a way to square the new electricity demand with earlier climate pledges.³⁸³ Many technology corporations are investing in highly speculative CCS ventures.³⁸⁴ For example, Google backed a start-up that plans to link with data centers to capture 500 tons of CO₂ annually.³⁸⁵

Data centers are also drawing in other corporations who want to cash in on CCS. ExxonMobil and Chevron have both announced plans to build natural gas power plants with CCS to supply electricity to data centers.³⁸⁶ In its press release, ExxonMobil is excited to emphasize that CCS will let the company decarbonize a broad swath of the economy, making Exxon a climate champion for its development of technology.³⁸⁷ Chevron’s planned natural gas plants will not initially use CCS, merely leaving space to later add the technology.³⁸⁸

Direct air capture is an attractive fantasy that is unlikely to go away

Direct air capture (DAC) holds a unique status among CCS technologies due its promise to turn the clock back on bad climate decisions. However, DAC is unlikely up to this lofty role. Beyond the prohibitive energy requirements, DAC has proven to be very expensive.³⁸⁹ While corporations are undoubtedly eager to reduce costs, existing facilities have not succeeded in producing substantially cheaper DAC.³⁹⁰ An existing DAC facility run by Climeworks sells carbon removal credits for \$1,500 a ton.³⁹¹ Even at new facilities, Climeworks says costs for capturing CO₂ are closer to \$1,000 than

\$100 per ton, but it is aiming to reduce these to \$300 to \$350 per ton by 2030 (meaning that it would still cost \$2.67 to \$3.11 to capture the carbon emitted by a gallon of gasoline).³⁹²

High costs have coincided with delays in deploying DAC at larger scales. As of May 7, 2024, the biggest DAC facility is Climeworks's Mammoth facility that the company claims captures 36,000 tons of carbon per year — 0.00000712 percent of 2022 U.S. CO₂ emissions.³⁹³ As discussed earlier, Occidental's planned DAC plant has delayed its opening and raised cost projections multiple times.³⁹⁴

Conclusion

While the declarations of a bright future for carbon capture echo past waves of hype, carbon capture dreams remain as elusive now as they were at the height of clean coal enthusiasm. The inherent energy costs and technological barriers to widespread CCS adoption will likely preclude the use of CCS in all but a few niche, dirty industries. However, CCS provides cover for continued fossil fuel investment and an excuse to funnel yet more public money to the oil and gas industry. The time has come to take CCS off the table as a climate solution by ending subsidies, banning the building of CCS infrastructure, and transitioning to a 100 percent renewable energy system.

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