USDA Should Revise Avian Flu Plan, Coalition Statement

A broad coalition of stakeholder groups issued a statement criticizing the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s plan for responding to a U.S. outbreak of bird flu and calling for revisions to protect the public and poultry farmers. The coalition charged that the USDA does not acknowledge the risk posed by common poultry industry practices in the emergence and spread of highly-pathogenic avian influenza.

Click here to get the file

We represent consumers, organic, minority and family farmers, ranchers, animal welfare advocates, contract poultry growers, poultry workers, unions, environmentalists, religious groups, social justice organizations and concerned citizens. Our groups are concerned that the current government approach to avian influenza is flawed, and that the plan proposed by the USDA’s Animal Plant Health Inspection Service for responding to an outbreak in the U.S. is inadequate in several respects.

1. The plan does not acknowledge the risk of industrialized poultry operations in the emergence and spread of highly-pathogenic avian influenza. This risk is due in part to the vulnerability to disease created when thousands of genetically similar birds with low resistance are confined together in cramped, unhygienic houses.

2. The plan could have potentially devastating results for small family farmers and free-range, organic, and outdoor poultry growers because there is no clearly defined procedure for testing for and detecting the disease before culling of flocks begins. These groups are especially at risk because of the potential targeting of outdoor flocks and wild migratory birds as the prime vehicles for the virus’ spread.

3. The plan does not include a process for directly compensating all producers for destroyed flocks, specifically contract growers who have put a significant amount of capital into their poultry operations. All of the associated costs of depopulating a flock in as humane and environmentally sound a way as possible should be covered for all growers, contract or otherwise.

4. The plan does not call for the adoption of the least inhumane possible techniques for mass depopulation and environmentally sound methods for disposal of destroyed flocks and poultry waste.

5. The plan does not adequately address dangers faced by workers who handle live poultry, process poultry or depopulate infected flocks and need to ensure appropriate protective equipment, specialized sanitation, training, human flu vaccinations (to prevent co-infection) and whistleblower protections for workers who detect and report sick birds.

6. The plan does not address the risk of spreading avian influenza through movement of poultry and poultry products. This risk comes not only from the legal movement of poultry, wild birds, and bird products, but also from illegal smuggling of poultry and live birds and from the use of poultry litter as a fertilizer and an ingredient for livestock and fish feed.

7. The plan does not address the potentially huge economic impacts for small processors and the vulnerability for the many workers at large plants if quarantines or depopulation eliminate the supply of poultry.

For the national response plan to serve all of the constituencies affected by a potential outbreak of highly-pathogenic avian influenza, it must include the following provisions:

1. All growers (contract, free-range, organic, outdoor and family farmers) should be directly compensated for their lost income due to depopulation or quarantine; time without flocks; and depopulation, disposal, and sanitizing costs.

2. Based on current information, when a flock has to be depopulated, the World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) euthanasia guidelines should be followed, with a preference for whole-house gassing with CO2, or, if necessary, containerized gassing with an inert gas mixture containing no more than 20 percent CO2 by volume.

3. Procedures for venting, dust control, and transportation and disposal of bird carcasses and waste should be improved and monitored to protect the environment and surrounding community and prevent spread of the disease.

4. Testing for the disease should be extended, and immediate quarantines should be enforced when the disease is detected. Also, neighbors should be notified about symptoms of the disease and steps for protecting themselves.

5. The Secretary of Labor and Secretary of Health and Human Services must develop and issue standards to protect potentially exposed health care workers, workers who handle live poultry, poultry processing workers, workers who depopulate infected flocks, and workers who track wild fowl. These workers should all be the highest priority for receiving appropriate vaccines, be provided with personal protective equipment (respiratory, eye and clothing), and be covered by whistleblower protections when reporting sick birds and suspected infection.

The signatories (for a complete list including contact information, download the pdf version of this statement Click here to get the file):